Since Stcherbatsky’s Buddhist Logic, it has been well known among scholars of Indian Buddhist pramāṇa theory that the word “vināśa” denotes two things. One meaning is “a thing itself” (bhāva eva) which is perishable—this I call a “positive interpretation”; the other meaning is “perishing” (vinaśana), i.e., “becoming a non-existence” (pradhvaṃsa)—which I call a “negative interpretation”. These two interpretations can be traced back to Dharmakīrti at the latest, and in this paper, I clarify just how Dharmakīrti relates these two vināśas to each other.
Namely, it is explained that the latter vināśa is what slow-witted people cognize when they are to determine an entity’s impermanence (anityatva). However, this kind of vināśa cannot actually become an object of perception since it is not a real thing in nature. Rather, it can be perceived only as the perception of some other thing (anyopalabdhi) found instead, e.g., as the perception of a certain place (pradeśa) devoid of (vivikta) the entity in question. On the other hand, the former vināśa, i.e., the positively interpreted one, can be inferred only once they have already determined the entity’s impermanence. All this inference proves, however, is that the entity was, while it existed, already identical with its perishing, i.e., momentary (kṣaṇika).
In the second part of the paper, I also consider Dharmakīrti’s reasoning for just why vināśa should be interpreted in these two ways.
