In the section immediately before the last part of the Viṃśatikāvṛtti (hereafter VV), Vasubandhu discusses his understanding of the knowledge of others’ minds (paracittajñāna). First he introduces the theory of the opponent of his consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra) theory who accepts the real-existence of the external world. The opponent argues that, if one does not know others’ minds, the knowledge of others’ minds cannot be established. However, if one knows others’ minds then others’ minds must be external objects and therefore the consciousness-only theory cannot be established.
Objecting to this argument, Vasubandhu counters that the inability of knowing others’ minds accurately is the very proof of the non-existence of the external object as presented in the consciousness-only theory. Vasubandhu says that the knowledge of others’ minds is false like the knowledge of one’s own mind (svacittajñāna). One’s attachment to knowing one’s own mind and the minds of others which are falsely cognized by fracturing and reconstructing one’s internal consciousness can only produce the fractured and falsely discriminating knowledge of one’s mind as a subjective mind and the minds of others as objective minds.
The mind being fractured into subjectivity and objectivity further produces the relationship of grasper (grāhaka) and grasped (grāhya) and the nature of grasping (parikalpitasvabhāva) is to have a complex multi-layered structure.
In contrast, the non-dual wisdom of the Buddha is the knowledge of Dharma-nature beyond any verbal expressions, transcending time and space and different from the mundane wisdom of objective knowledge of simple objects in the external world.
