In his writing, Kuiji, (632–682), the foremost disciple of Xuanzang (602–664) interprets the notion of mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa) of Dignāga (ca. 480–540) as a function of the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness. For this reason, it is named as “the mental consciousness arising simultaneously together with the five [sensory consciousnesses] (MSF).” To define this as a kind of perception would raise a few issues: Why do we need such a notion? Would it lead to the absurd consequence that even a person born blind can still see? If not, then what is the relation between such consciousness and a simultaneous sensory consciousness? If this qualifies as a kind of perception, then it must be without conceptualization. But what kind of role does it play in cognition as a non-conceptualizing mental perception? Why is it necessary? What is its conscious content? How does the content of a sensory consciousness get transmitted or shared with a MSF? And how do its conscious content and function differ from sensory consciousnesses on the one hand and from conceptualizing mental consciousness on the other? Does it function like a sensus communis so as to accommodate all kinds of sensory content such as visual, auditory and olfactory? This paper seeks to answer the above questions and depict a picture of such cognition based on the works of Kuiji. With this as a clue, we may have a better understanding of Dignāga’s notion of “mental perception.”
