Philosophy; Religion and theology; Buddaghosa; Comparative philosophy; Hume; David; Identity; Meditation; Moral sentiments; Nagarjuna; Skepticism
摘要
The body of the dissertation is focused on a comparison between David Hume, on the one hand, and two Buddhist figures, on the other hand: Buddhaghosa and Nāgārjuna. The dissertation begins with a chapter that analyzes some of the challenges surrounding a comparative discussion between Western philosophy and Asian systems of thought from a perspective grounded in academic philosophy. The Second Chapter investigates some of the current issues which surround comparisons between religions in religious studies. Chapter Three looks at the life of Hume. Chapter Four is a discussion of Hume's notion of personal identity where he argues that we are merely a bundle of perceptions and nothing more. In the end I argue that Hume must be hesitantly viewed as a reductionist. In Chapter Five, I discuss the idea of Buddhism and how it is often misused. The basic point of the chapter is that Buddhism is far more complex than most scholars realize, and any attempt to generalize Buddhism must be advanced with serious prudence, or, at least, with full cognizance of the challenges likely to be faced in such an endeavor. Chapter Six is a discussion of the life of Buddhaghosa. In Chapter Seven, I investigate Buddhaghosa's view of personal identity. In the end, I categorize Buddhaghosa as an eliminativist about the self. In Chapter Eight, I compare Hume and Buddhaghosa's notions of the self In Chapter I argue that Hume's skepticism is more serious than contemporary scholars think. Chapter Ten is an investigation of Nāgārjuna's life and his skepticism. Chapter Eleven is a comparison between Hume and Nāgārjuna's skepticism. I argue that they should both be viewed as highly skeptical. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of Hume's moral sentiments and Buddhist meditation in which I argue that meditation might help substantiate Hume's claim that we have moral sentiments.
