바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 둘러싼 몇 가지 해석상의 문제들 - Yuktidīpikā와의 관련성을 중심으로=A Study on Several Probolems in Analysis of Vasubandhu's Proof of Momentariness: with a focus on connection with Yuktidīpikā
찰나멸론; 찰나멸 논증; 바수반두; 세친= Vasubandhu; 구사론; 상키야; 멸무인설; 불교논리학; 다르마키르티; Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness; Proof of Momentariness; Buddhist Logic; Dharmakīrti; Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa; Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; Yuktidīpikā; Saṃkhya
摘要
이 논문에서는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 이해하는 데 있어서 제기되는 문제들을 다룬다. 이에 대한 해결을 위해서 우선적으로 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 둘러싼 역사적 전후사정을 다룬다. 첫 번째 문제는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증이 논리적인 문제를 지니고 있다는 카츠라(桂)의 지적에 관한 것이다. 2장에서는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증 전반을 논리적으로 분석한다. 이를 위해서 당시의 논리적 배경과 사회적 상식을 활용하는 방법을 취할 것이다. 그것을 통해 카츠라의 해석에 대한 비판적 검토를 진행한다. 또 다른 문제는 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증을 겨냥하고 이에 대한 반론 을 펼친 것으로 보이는 상키야학파의 논서 Yuktidīpikā에서 지엽적인 주제라 할 수 있는 불꽃ㆍ소리ㆍ인식 따위의 비순간성에 대해서 지나치게 집중하고 있다는 점이다. 3장에서는 이에 관한 논리적 배경을 탐색하고자 한다. 이 두 가지 문제는 긴밀한 상호관련이 있으며, 한 쪽 문제가 다른 쪽 문제를 풀어주는 매개 역할을 한다. 최종적으로는 이를 통해서 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증이 지니는 논리학상의 의의에 관해서 다루었다. 바수반두의 논증이 이전의 논증들과 구분되는 점들을 지적하고, 그가 배치하고자 했던 논리적 설정들을 파악한다. 이를 통해서 바수반두가 찰나멸을 논증함에 있어서 취했던 선택과 의도를 추출하고자 한다.
The aim of this paper is to analyze Vasubandhu's Proof of Momentariness. To start with, this paper seeks to address the following questions: 1. Is the proof of Vasubandhu an error? 2. Why does the writer of Yuktidīpikā deeply attach to dispute on momentariness of flame etc.? The notion ‘All the existence in the real world is impermanent’ underlies the ideas of Indian philosophical schools. However, regarding the signification and application scope of anitya, various interpretations have been raised. Answers to how such impermanent things are able to maintain their appearance widely vary based on the assumption that everything in the world is impermanent. Anitya is a notion that is commonly accepted by Indian philosophical schools, yet an understanding of the phenomenal world varies depending how differently the anitya is viewed varies. Historically, thus, there have been a lot of disputes between schools with different views. Buddhism on the basis of anitya as key doctrine suggested the most strict standards regarding the application scope of anitya. Basically, Buddhism does not accept either immortal gods nor eternal and fundamental cause for the creation of all things. Particularly since Abhidharma doctrines had the system, in the Buddhist schools, the doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) that saw that all things and facts were created and became extinct repetitively every single moment played an important role in explaining anitya theoretically. Disputes on the doctrine of momentariness in Yuktidīpikā proceeds in a different way from rebuttals to it by the Nyāya School or Vātsīputrīya on which many studies have been conducted. Vātsīputrīya and the Nyāya school do not accept the changes every moment claimed by Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, Yogacāra and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school. To them, things continue to exist with self-identity and are destroyed by external causes only. Thus, in the disputes on the momentariness relating to Vātsīputrīya and the Nyāya School, the changes every moment is the important subject of argument. The theory of momentariness is the core tenets that define anitya in Buddhism. The stance of the Sāṃkhya school on momentariness has undergone transitions through the historial process. The discussion in Yuktidīpikā 10 is placed in the last stage of that historical process. The reason why Sāṃkhya could not accept the momentariness while claiming the changeableness was because the notion of Buddhism and the casual relationship and the notion of the extinction did not correspond with each other, which incurred the big difference in the stance on the significance of the existence between them. This is the reason why both Buddhism and Sāṃkhya explain the flow of time in different ways. Sāṃkhya in the disputes in Yuktidīpikā explains the reason the phenomena in front of our eyes disappear because they are melt into the origin, prakrti. Sāṃkhya claims that the existence perpetually continues through changes, not accepting the extinction of existence. In the disputes of Yuktidīpikā 10, this stance of Ṣāmkhya is identified in various manners.
目次
I들어가며. 122 II 문제1 : 바수반두의 찰나멸 논증은 오류인가. 127 III 문제2 : 왜 Yuktidīpikā는 불꽃 따위의 논의에 집착하는가. 139 IV 바수반두 찰나멸 논증의 논리학적 의의 145
