본고는 최근 서구학계에서 의식의 본성에 대해 현상학과 불교 유식학 사이를 비교하여 논의한 작업들에 의해 촉발되어 작성된 것이다. 두 전통 간의 대화가 의식의 성격을 이해하는데 도움이 될 것이라는 지적은 공히 알려진 것이지만, 특히 여기서는 ‘자기인식’ 개념을 중심으로 현상학과 유식학의 논의들이 어떤 점에서 상보적이 될 수 있는지를 보여주려고 했다. 나는 먼저 Paul Williams(1998)의 두 종류의 자기인식(self-awareness)의 구별에서 출발했다. 특히 그의 “self-awareness (ii)”가 어떻게 이해될 수 있는지를 현상학자로서 Zahavi(2005)의 의식에 대한 논의와 그에 대한 불교학자 Dreyfus(2011)의 비판적 고찰을 단서로 해서 그것이 유식의 삼성설의 관점에서 어떻게 이해될 수 있는지를 다루고자 했다. 다시 말해, 그것이 의식 자체의 성질인지 아니면 수행을 통한 의식의 질적 변화인지를 문제 삼고자 했다. 왜냐하면 그들의 논의에서 두 측면이 매우 혼재되어 사용되고 있다고 보이기 때문이다. 본고에서는 이 문제를 『해심밀경』에서 삼상을 설명하기 위해 사용된 비유들의 의미를 다시 물음으로써 논의하고 해결하고자 했다.
Recently, there have been some researches, which deal with the problems of consciousness from the comparative viewpoint, particularly between the Mind-Only school of Buddhism and Phenomenology. For it is believed that the Dialogue between the two traditions will enable us to understand the nature of consciousness more closely. This paper, motivated by these researches, aims at understanding the specific nature of ‘self-awareness’ of consciousness which was divided into ‘self-awareness (i)’ and ‘self-awareness (ii)’ by Paul Williams (1998). Particularly interesting is to see how his concept of ‘self-awareness (ii)’, defined as reflexive nature of consciousness by himself, is understood by various Buddhist scholars, such as G. Dreyfus (2011) and B. Kellner (2010). The former seems to understand it as a kind of pure knowledge in the sense of “Great perfection (Dzogs chen)”, whereas the latter excludes it from the Dharmakirtian interpretation of the ‘self-awareness’, which has been used as a kind of intentionality in Husserlian sense. Relying on the explanation of Zahavi (2005) and some criticisms on it by Dreyfus (2011), I want to suggest that there may be found some considerations on the self-awareness in the Yogācāra texts. I think, the meaning of ‘self-awareness (ii)’ can be more clearly delineated when we investigate its meaning from the viewpoint of the Three-Characteristics/-Natures of the Yogācāra philosophy, for both theories are closely aiming at the explanation of the consciousness. So, my research for finding the clues of the theory of self-awareness (ii) in the Yogācāra texts focuses actually on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, particularly in the context where the theory of three Characteristics is defined and illustrated. In the illustration of crystal and clear mirror, I think, the meaning of the self-awareness was introduced for the first time in the Yogācāra tradition. My conclusion is that the ‘self-awareness (ii)’ is closely related to the state of paratantra-lakṣaṇa, in sofar as it is regarded as belonging to the perfected characteristics (pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa). In my view, however, this aspect can not be identified with the pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa per se. In this regard, it should be regarded as having some forms of intentionality.
目次
I 의식에 대한 현상학적 해명과 자기인식. 6 II 자기인식에 관한 여러 이론들과 그 문제점. 11 III 『해심밀경』의 비유에 나타난 삼상설과 식의 자기인식의 문제. 18 IV 끝맺는 말 39
